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LISA BERNSTEIN*

The Silicon Valley Lawyer as
Transaction Cost Engineer?

A

T a time when the legal profession is under assault from
many quarters-blamed for America's lack of global competitiveness by the Quayle Commission,' described in the popular press as a profession of sharks and shysters,2 and
characterized by a leading academic as a profession "in danger of
losing its soul"a-Mark Suchman's sociological study of lawyers
in the Silicon Valley' presents an alternative view of the legal
* Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank
Eric Posner, Chris Kimball, Richard Painter, Edward Bernstein, Daniel Klerman,
Robert Merges, Maureen O'Rourke, David Dana, Amy Howe and Karen
Fredericks.
1 See A Reportfrom the President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform in America (1991), reprinted in 42 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1760 (1993).
2 See Marc Fischer, Life Without Lawyers? Defenders' Study Says We'll Miss
Them. Don't Laugh, WASH. POST, July 8, 1994, at BI (noting the existence of a 900
phone number, the "shark line, devoted entirely to lawyer jokes"); Michael Hill,
May it Pleasethe Court, Lawyers Just Want to Be Happy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994,
at 11 (noting that lawyers are "often regarded as shysters and sharks").
3 ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS IN THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 1 (1993) (mourning the demise of the lawyer-statesman, "possessed of
great practical wisdom and exceptional persuasive powers, devoted to the public
good but keenly aware of the limitations of human beings and their political
arrangements").
4 This essay was originally prepared as a comment on Mark C. Suchman, On Advice of Counsel: Law Firms and Venture Capital Funds as Information Intermediaries in the Structuration of Silicon Valley (1994) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Stanford University) [hereinafter On Advice], Mark C. Suchman and
Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in the Silicon Valley (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Oregon Law Review) [hereinafter Hired Gun], Mark C. Suchman and Mia L. Cahill,
The Hired Gun as Conciliator: Lawyers and the Suppression of Business Disputes in
the Silicon Valley (Nov. 20, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Oregon
Law Review) [hereinafter Conciliator], as well as on oral remarks delivered by
Suchman at the 1992 Law and Society Meetings in Chicago, Illinois, and at the 1993
University of Wisconsin-Madison Conference, "Changing Patterns in Business Disputing." In its current form, this essay also responds to some points raised in Mark
C. Suchman, Translation Costs: A Comment on Sociology and Economics, 74 OR. L.
[239]
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profession. It describes a market, the market for venture capital
financing of "new technology-based corporations," where lawyers are viewed favorably by their clients and are perceived of as
adding value to a transaction rather than arguing over how to
divide the transactional pie.
The study's detailed description of Silicon Valley legal practice
is aimed at debunking the myths of the "lawyer as hired gun,"5
and the lawyer "as transaction cost," 6 suggesting instead that the
lawyers play several different roles in Silicon Valley transactions,
roles Suchman labels as "counseling, '7 "dealmaking," "matchmaking," 9 "gatekeeping,"' and "proselytizing,"' 1 or, more generally, "conciliating.'12
This essay does not directly take issue with Suchman's conclusion that the image of the "lawyer as hired gun" does not accurately characterize the role of lawyers in the Silicon Valley.
Indeed, the "hired gun" image is strikingly inappropriate in the
transactional setting he focuses on in the most detail-high-technology venture capital financing. However, it suggests that the
"hired gun" image is something of a straw man. The lawyer as
REv. 257 (1995) [hereinafter Translation Costs], as well as Suchman's oral remarks
at this symposium.
5 This characterization is based on Hired Gun, supra note 4.
6 See id at 1 (noting that Suchman's study casts doubt on the idea that lawyers
have a "chilling effect ... on larger systems of economic activity... [because] selfinterested attorneys goad their clients into an excessively punctilious awareness of
legal rights... [which] in turn, drains the reservoir of trust and good faith that would
otherwise lubricate the wheels of commerce").
7 On Advice, supra note 4, at 99 (explaining that in their counseling role, "attorneys see themselves as offering general business advice, rather than purely legal
guidance").
8 Id. at 96 (suggesting that "when acting as dealmakers, Silicon Valley attorneys
employ their connections in the local business community in order to link clients
with various transactional partners").
9 Id. at 113 (explaining that the "organizational matchmaking role has three parts
... matchmakers ... winnow out 'ineligible' clients, who are so deviant either ethically or structurally that representing them would besmirch the matchmaker's reputation... [they] formulate typologies of clients and encourage those who are seeking
partners to certain culturally approved models... [and they] apply cultural 'rules of
compatibility' to their clienteles, arranging matches between 'likes' and discouraging
contact between 'unlikes"').
10 Id. at 108 (explaining that "a 'gatekeeping' system seems to be emerging, in
which law firms use their control over resource flows to screen out entities that challenge Silicon Valley's structural or behavioral taken-for-granteds or that otherwise
threaten community cohesion").
11 Id. at 109 (explaining that proselytizing "consists of counseling activity directed
toward encouraging certain types of deals and discouraging others").
12 Conciliator, supra note 4.
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"hired gun" may accurately characterize the role of business litigators-although in that context too the characterization is misleading in an era when most disputes are settled out of court and
corporate use of alternative dispute resolution techniques is increasing dramatically.' 3 However, leaving litigators off to one
side, the image of the lawyer as hired gun is not an accurate characterization of the role of any transactional business lawyer, at
least any good transactional business lawyer, in the Silicon Valley
or elsewhere.' 4
This essay suggests another characterization of the function of
lawyers in the Silicon Valley, a characterization of the business
lawyer first put forth by Ronald Gilson, the lawyer as a value
creating transaction cost engineer. 15 It briefly reexamines some
of Suchman's most salient findings about Silicon Valley legal
practice' 6 from Gilson's economic perspective, 7 and argues that
13 There is no direct measure of corporate use of ADR. However, over 600 large
corporations and 1800 of their subsidiaries, including more than half of the Fortune
500 companies, have signed the Corporate Policy Statement on Alternatives to Litigation which provides, in part, that "[in the event of a business dispute between our
corporation and another corporation which has made or will then make a similar
statement, we are prepared to explore with that other party, resolution of the dispute through negotiation or ADR techniques before resorting to full scale litigation." CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, CENTER FOR PUB. RESOURCES, CORPORATE POLICY
STATEMENT: ALTERNATIVES TO LITIGATION (1991).
14 It is interesting to note that while Suchman suggests that Silicon Valley lawyers
"reduce both conflict and uncertainty by seeing local capital markets not in an adversarial light, but as social structures with shared norms and well-established information flows," Conciliator, supra note 4, at 9, he does not provide any reasons to
think that such transactions would be concluded in an adversarial setting even in
contexts where the strong elements of social cohesion he finds in Silicon Valley legal
practice are absent. Indeed, in transactions where lawyers are often compensated
under a "deferred billing structure," where, "if a company doesn't get funded...
[the law firm will not] look to the founders, personally, to pay... [but if the] client
... successfully locate[s] financing ...[the] law firm's premium fees [will immediately be paid] out of the newly-obtained capital reserves," Hired Gun, supra note 4,
at 12, it is particularly hard to understand why lawyers would want to engage in any
of the types of "adversarial" or hired gun behaviors that might increase the risk that
the company will be unable to secure financing.
15 See Ronald Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984); see also Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law,
Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary Report, 64 IND. U.
555, 562 (1989) (noting that "[t]he Silicon Valley lawyer not only works with engineers, he thinks of himself as a kind of engineer-a legal engineer ...his job is to
solve problems, to take a principle, a task and engineer it legally").
16 Suchman's findings about the roles lawyers play in Silicon Valley transactions
are based on "a series of roughly 25 semi-structured qualitative interviews ... interviews [that] were divided approximately equally between lawyers, venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs," as well as "informal conversations with a handful of journalists,
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when the roles and functions of Silicon Valley lawyers described
by Suchman are analyzed in economic terms, it becomes clear
that many of the roles that Suchman associates more closely with
Silicon Valley lawyers than with the legal profession as a whole
are, when viewed from Gilson's perspective, performed by business lawyers, at least skilled business lawyers, in a wide variety of
settings. It also suggests that even those roles and functions that
appear to be either unique or unusually prominent in the Silicon
Valley can nevertheless be understood as responses to many of
the same types of underlying strategic considerations that Gilson
discusses in his analysis of how the ordinary business lawyer creates value for his client.
Part I of this essay presents a brief overview of Gilson's theory.
Part II then summarizes some of Suchman's findings and explores the ways that Gilson's insights can be used to help
Suchman more effectively debunk the myth of the "lawyer as
transaction cost," and the ways that Suchman's findings might be
used to provide support for Gilson's suggestion that lawyers are
value creating transaction cost engineers. Part III discusses how
combining the theoretical and methodological approaches of law
& economics and law & sociology can improve legal scholarship
in general and Suchman's study in particular. Finally, the essay
concludes that analyzing Suchman's findings from an explicitly
economic perspective can yield insights into what it means to be
a good transactional lawyer in the Silicon Valley or elsewhere.

I
GILSON's FRAMEWORK

In a 1984 article, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 8 Ronald Gilson explores the question:
how, if at all, do business lawyers add value to transactions apart
from merely guiding clients through complex regulations or helpacademics, and other informal community watchers." Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 2
n.3.

17 Contrary to Suchman's suggestion in his comment, this essay does not claim to
be "either more descriptively accurate or more aesthetically appealing than [his]
original sociological rendition."

Translation Costs, supra note 4, at 257. Rather, it

seeks to analyze the factual information Suchman presents in an effort to better
understand why the legal profession is viewed in a more positive light in Silicon

Valley than elsewhere and to better understand the ways, apart from drafting more
complete contingent state contracts, that transactional lawyers might be able to create value for their clients.
18 Gilson, supra note 15.
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ing them obtain a bigger share of the pie in a distributive bargaining situation? In answering this question, Gilson begins by
describing what is known in the finance literature as the Capital
Asset Pricing Model.' 9 For the purposes of this essay it is not
necessary to review the details of the model but only to note that
because in the hypothetical world of the model "capital assets
will be priced correctly as a result of market forces, business lawyers cannot increase the value of a transaction." 2 As a consequence, absent the need to navigate complex government
regulations, "the fees charged by business lawyers would decrease the net value of the transaction."'" In other words, in the
world of the capital asset pricing model, lawyers or any other
third party intermediaries would, by definition, be value decreasing transaction costs.
The Capital Asset Pricing Model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions2-ways in which the world of the model
diverges from the so-called real world-and it is these simplifying
assumptions that are of primary relevance to our inquiry,
namely, that: (1) information about the asset and about the relevant markets is costlessly available to all transactors; (2) there
are no transaction costs; (3) buyers and sellers have homogeneous expectations, that is, similar views about the risk and return
associated with the relevant asset(s); and (4) buyers and sellers
have similar time horizons, that is, they are trying to maximize
their returns over the same relevant time period.
Using these assumptions as his starting point, Gilson suggests
that lawyers create value by bringing the real world of an individual transaction closer to the hypothetical world of the model and,
in so doing, increase the size of the transactional pie. 23 As Gilson
19 For an overview of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, see RICHARD A. BREARLY
AND STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

(4th ed. 1991), at

ch. 8.

20 Gilson, supra note 15, at 251.
21 Id.

22 Both the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Gilson assume away another cate-

gory of costs that characterize important ways that the real world of a particular
transaction may diverge from the world of the model, namely legal system costs,
those costs that arise from the fact that using the legal system to enforce a contract is
costly and inherently uncertain. For a discussion introducing the idea of legal system
costs and elaborating on how taking them into account might alter Gilson's analysis,
see Edward A. Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structureof Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer's View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L.
REv. 189 (1995).

23 Gilson, supra note 15, at 300.
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puts it, "when markets fall short of perfection, 24 that is, when
the model's assumptions do not perfectly describe the real world,
which of course they never do, "incentives exist for private innovations that improve market performance. As long as the costs
of innovation are less than the resulting gains, private innovation
to reduce the extent of market failure creates value. It is in precisely this fashion that the opportunity exists for business lawyers
to create value."'2 5
The market for venture capital is, in many respects, characterized by extreme divergences from the world of the capital asset
pricing model. As Suchman explains:
High-technology start-ups confront investors not only with
high failure rates and dramatically variable returns, but also
with large elements of sheer guesswork. Markets for new
technologies are notoriously difficult to predict, since the performance of any given start-up may depend on technological
developments that post date the firm's founding; since these
technological developments themselves often depend on essentially random elements of timing and serendipity, they cannot be forecast even probabilistically. Further, hightechnology investors may have difficulty identifying a relevant
universe of technologies from which to construct a portfolio
.... Equally formidable cognitive hurdles plague high-technology entrepreneurs ...innovators often face the challenge
of locating start-up funding in a time-sensitive environment

where even small delays may (or may not) prove commercially
disastrous .... [And,] founders are often hard-put to evaluate
26
the fairness of those funding offers which they do receive.
Thus, (1) because information is often costly, unavailable or
largely unverifiable; (2) because entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often have very different expectations about the risk and
return associated with particular companies; (3) because the time
horizons of venture capital funds and entrepreneurs may be different; and (4) because venture capital financing agreements are
complicated and might require the parties to incur substantial
transaction costs, it is not surprising that Silicon Valley lawyers
are viewed favorably by their clients. The greater the divergence
between the world of a transaction and the world of the capital
asset pricing model, the more opportunities business lawyers are
likely to have to create value for their clients.
24 ld at 253.
25 1&L
26

Conciliator, supra note 4, at 7.
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II
THE

SILICON VALLEY LAWYER AS TRANSACTION
COST ENGINEER?

In order to understand how Silicon Valley lawyers might create
value, it is useful to explore how, in the many legal and nonlegal
roles they play, lawyers' activities might bring the real-world of a
given transaction closer to the hypothetical-world of the capital
asset pricing model. It is also interesting to take a step back and
consider whether some of the less transaction specific roles
played by these lawyers might be understood as "private innovations that improve market performance."2 7 According to Gilson, if lawyers really do create value, it should be possible to
"find tracks of this activity in their transactional behavior." 28 As
a consequence, it is useful to look for such tracks by exploring
the counseling, dealmaking, matchmaking, gatekeeping and
proselytizing roles that Silicon Valley29 lawyers play in a typical
venture capital financing transaction.
The Silicon Valley lawyer's role in a typical venture capital financing transaction begins when an entrepreneur approaches
him with an idea for a company. The lawyer, in his capacity as a
counselor, assists the entrepreneur in developing a business plan
that identifies the information investors consider relevant and
packages it in a form familiar to the venture capital funds. As
one lawyer explained:
We're one of the forces that makes the fundraising market
more efficient by saying, 'what you do is you have a business
plan. You refine that to the point where it meets the standards
and criteria that venture capitalists expect in business plans. It
shouldn't be 800 pages long.'... Then you get30 that out and get
feedback, and you'll [read] those tea leaves.
Once a business plan has been developed, the lawyer's role in
the transaction changes from "counseling" to "matchmaking,"
"dealmaking," and "gatekeeping." In these capacities Silicon
Valley lawyers play an essential role in transmitting information
and bringing entrepreneurs and venture capital funds together.
27 Gilson, supra note 15, at 253.
28
Id. at 256.
29 The description of Silicon Valley legal practice presented in this essay is based
solely on information presented in the sources cited in note 4, supra. Because the
essay submitted by Suchman for publication in this symposium does not present an
overview of his findings, it is necessary to do so here.
30 Conciliator, supra note 4, at 21.
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Law firms control access to a substantial percentage of Silicon
Valley's venture capital flow; one firm alone controls approximately forty percent to sixty percent of the capital available in
the Valley. 31 Funds acknowledge that lawyers are "an important
part of th[e] whole network of deal flow,"' 32 entrepreneurs realize
that it is essential to hire a law firm with an established reputation, and law firms explicitly recognize their matchmaking role in
bringing entrepreneurs and venture capital funds together. As
one lawyer explained, his firm has:
[A] committee that does this. When a partner has a new company that needs financing, we'll brainstorm just a little bit on
who would be the best funds to send it to. Based on our
knowledge of venture funds, and based on our knowledge of
people in those funds, we can make introductions to people
who we think would be good people to look at a particular
proposal.33
Lawyers' abilities to perform these matchmaking and dealmaking functions-and to do so in ways that minimize the joint pretransaction search costs for the parties-depend on their position
in the market as long term participants with established reputations as well as on their superior information about the business
plans and prospects of potential start-up firms and the post-deal
behavior of various funds.'
A lawyer's investment in acquiring information about a potential start-up is less transaction specific than an equivalent investment made by a venture capital fund. If a law firm investigates a
company and finds that it is not an appropriate investment for
one fund, it might nevertheless be able to recommend it to another fund. In contrast, a venture capital fund that spent money
to investigate a start-up but decided not to finance it would obtain no return on its investment. Similarly, while it would be pro31 On Advice, supra note 4, at 96; see also id. at 99 (noting that as one venture
capitalist explained, "the more senior lawyers have entrepreneurs that they are effectively representing on a no-fund retainer basis, and they get involved very early in
these deals. The good lawyers have a lot of say over which funds see which entrepreneur.
That's a very valuable role they play").
32
Id.at 97.
33 Conciliator, supra note 4, at 23-24.
34 Venture capital funds are concerned with being viewed favorably by law firms.
As one fund partner explained, "we just did mailings to all the lawyers in Silicon
Valley, making sure they knew who we were-so they wouldn't think we were some
odd-ball firm in the hinterlands. Lawyers can act as a detriment if they don't know
who you are and you don't have the relationships with them." On Advice, supra
note 4, at 97.
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hibitively expensive for each entrepreneur to inquire into the
post-deal behavior of each fund to whom it submitted a business
plan, it might be worthwhile for a law firm to obtain this type of
information since it would be valuable to the firm in advising
other clients in similar types of transactions.
Lawyers also play a role in verifying much of the initial information provided by the entrepreneur who is, in most cases, a new
market entrant without an established reputation. After investigating the start-up's prospects, the lawyer, in effect, substitutes
his reputation for the reputation of the entrepreneur.35 Because
a law firm that encouraged a fund to investigate a company on
the basis of inaccurate information would suffer reputational
harm,3 6 funds are willing to rely on information provided by law
firms to a much greater extent than information provided by entrepreneurs. When a lawyer solicits financing for a business plan,
he is, in effect, providing the extra-legal equivalent of a lawyer's
opinion letter in a typical corporate acquisition transaction, or,
more specifically, a seller's opinion of counsel letter in the sale of
a private company. Because the reputations of their clients are
not effective bonding mechanisms, lawyers add value to the
transaction by posting their own reputation as a bond.37 In some
instances the posting of this type of bond enables transactions to
take place that otherwise would not occur. 38 As a partner at Wilson, Sonsini, the most powerful law firm in the Silicon Valley
35 As one venture capitalist explained, "[i]t doesn't make sense for a fledgling
company to use a law firm that has never done anything in the venture area. It
makes sense for them to focus on law firms that have a lot of contacts, that could
assist them. It just adds a little more credibility." Id.
36 Firms are wary of representing clients who might tarnish the firm's reputation.
As a Wilson, Sonsini partner explained, "the lawyer carries the ball for the client, in
terms of opening up connections and introducing the client to the business world.
We want to make sure that we're not making an introduction that will ultimately
backfire on us." Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 19.
37 In some transactions, lawyers also post a more traditional monetary bond by
agreeing to be compensated, at least in part, in the stock of the company. Id. at 12.
The lawyer's willingness to accept this form of compensation sends a credible signal
to the fund that the lawyer has faith in the company's prospects, and a credible
signal to the entrepreneur that the lawyer thinks the fund will behave in a way that
will lead to a successful venture.
38 For an interesting discussion about how lawyers who are able to establish a
credible reputation for engaging in cooperative behavior might create value for their
clients by, for example, enabling them to settle cases that might otherwise have gone
to trial, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509
(1994).
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noted, "clients are coming through more and more on the basis
of the firm's reputation and the perception that somehow we can
enable transactions where transactions might not otherwise be
possible."3 9
In sum, because their structural position in the market enables
them to back their representations with a meaningful reputation
bond, lawyers can function as cost efficient brokers who create
value by increasing the amount and reliability of the operational
and reputational information available to transactors while
greatly reducing the pre-transaction search costs associated with
venture capital financing transactions.
In the process of bringing entrepreneurs and funds together,
lawyers also perform what Suchman terms a gatekeeping function in which they "accept and refer clients selectively . . .
screen[ing] out entities that challenge Silicon Valley's structural
or behavioral taken-for-granteds or that threaten community cohesion."40 By screening out transactors who are unwilling to
abide by established transactional and behavioral norms, lawyers
increase the likelihood that "parties to a transaction will share a
common framework of basic values and assumptions ...

[that

will] moderate[ ] the uncertainty of anonymous market relations."'" They may therefore create value by bringing the expectations of both the parties to a particular transaction and
potential transactors in the market as a whole closer to the homogeneous expectations assumption of the capital asset pricing
model.
After bringing the entrepreneur and the fund together, the
lawyer resumes his role as counselor and assists the parties in
selecting an appropriate transactional form. Most Silicon Valley
lawyers encourage the parties to use one of several standard
form venture capital financing agreements. As one senior lawyer
explained, lawyers "have three cookie cutters and they just ask:
'Is it A, B, or C?' They are going to force these things into one of
those cookie cutters. '42 Accepting, for the purposes of discussion,4 3 Suchman's assertion that "contrary to the tenor of much
39 Conciliator,

supra note 4, at 16.

40 On Advice, supra note 4, at 108.

Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 19-20.
Id. at 23.
43 For the purposes of discussion this essay accepts Suchman's assertion that each
of the standard form financing agreements in widespread use "represents a logically
defensible vision of the venture capital relationship-a coherent facially-neutral im41
42
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of the trade literature," none of these standard form agreements
are "unequivocally 'pro-company' or 'pro-investor,'" it is possible to identify several ways in which the use of standard form
agreements might create value. First, the use of standard form
contracts might decrease pre-transaction negotiation costs. As
one lawyer observed, when "there's a transaction with one of the
other Silicon Valley law-firms, there's very little argument or negotiation about the agreement. It just goes smoothly. The transaction costs tend to be minimal, '4 5 while another lawyer noted,
"[w]hen I deal with lawyers in other parts of the country, they...
will go crazy over a lot of stuff that would just draw a yawn from
a Silicon Valley law firm."46 Because the post-deal relationship
between the entrepreneur and the fund is like a partnership,47
contentious or prolonged pre-transaction negotiations that erode
age upon whose merits well intentioned community members might honorably disagree." On Advice, supra note 4, at 303. This claim, however, cannot be verified
empirically since Suchman does not provide examples of these agreements. In addition, on the basis of theory alone there are reasons to doubt whether these forms are
evenhanded, particularly in transactions where one lawyer sometimes represents
both the entrepreneur and the fund. Unlike the entrepreneurs who are, for the most
part, unsophisticated one-time players in the market for initial venture capital financing, see Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that "a lot of people that start
companies have spent their careers as engineers--or, even less sophisticated, in
academia... [and] someone who has never [set up a company] ... generally ha[s] no
clue what's going on"), the funds are repeat players who, if satisfied by a particular
lawyer's services, would be likely to give the lawyer business in the future. As a
consequence, lawyers may have a strong financial incentive to draft contractual provisions that favor the funds at the expense of the entrepreneurs. Given this incentive, it might be that lawyers are not creating value, but are simply transferring value
from entrepreneurs to funds. Alternatively, they may be enlarging the transactional
pie but distributing most of the gains to the funds. However, Suchman's failure to
collect separate information about transactions where each party was represented by
its own lawyer and transactions where one lawyer represented both sides, as well as
his failure both to describe the standard forms and to investigate whether certain
forms were used more or less frequently in single-lawyer transactions, makes it impossible to determine which of these characterizations of the lawyers' counseling
role in drafting and urging parties to use standard form financing agreements is most
accurate.
44 On Advice, supra note 4, at 303. In reaching the conclusion that these forms
are, for the most part, evenhanded, Suchman fails to recognize that it is impossible
to determine whether an agreement is pro-company or pro-investor without also
looking at the transaction price since there is always a trade-off between price and
other contractual provisions.
45 Id. at 106.
46
Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 22.
47 As one venture capitalist put it, "we try to establish a true partnership with the
founders of companies, where we are very much on the same side of the fence in
terms of how the deal is structured." Conciliator, supra note 4,at 19 n.2.
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trust and goodwill may impose particularly high costs on the parties.48 As a consequence, reducing these costs has the potential
to create value. Second, reducing these types of "attitudinal" negotiating costs 49 may also reduce the likelihood of transaction
breakdown which may be especially valuable to the entrepreneurs, 50 since in these transactions "even small delays [in locating
financing] may... prove commercially disastrous."51 Finally, by
confronting transactors with an acceptable way of concluding the
transaction, these standard form agreements may induce some
parties who are either unfamiliar with, or do not intend to abide
by, the Valley's largely informal transactional norms to reveal
their identity since such parties are more likely than others to
seek to alter the standard form agreements to include additional
terms and protections.5 2
Thus, the use of standard contractual forms may create value
by reducing transaction and negotiating costs, reducing the likelihood of transaction breakdown, and, perhaps, increasing the
amount of information about particular parties' willingness to
abide by community norms. In addition, over time, the use of
standard form agreements may, as Suchman suggests, play an important role in lawyers' attempts to "construct... the normative
rules and the cognitive typifications . . . that make such transactions comprehensible, desirable, feasible and meaningful,"53 at48 Lawyers also reduce these types of negotiating costs in their role as proselytizers, see infra text accompanying notes 54-57, because "tutored in community
norms [by their lawyers], contracting parties know which demands are (or are not)
legitimate and 'reasonable'-which concessions others may expect of them, and
which concessions they may expect in return." Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 10.
49 For a discussion of the often ignored importance of attitudinal negotiation costs
in commercial transactions, see Edward Bernstein, supra note 22, at 229-32.
50 In many transactions, lawyers too will have an interest in reducing the likelihood of transaction breakdown since they bear most pre-transaction search costs
and are sometimes paid only if the deal goes through. In addition, because matching
a fund with a particularly contentious entrepreneur, or matching an entrepreneur
with a particularly contentious fund, might damage a lawyer's reputation as a matchmaker and dealmaker, lawyers have an incentive to ensure that negotiations proceed
smoothly.
51 Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 7.
52 These forms may, in effect, function as an information-forcing penalty default
rule. For discussions of the concept of penalty default rules see Lucian Ayre
Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract. The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 284 (1991), and
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
53 Translation Costs, supra note 4, at 264.
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tempts that may facilitate the evolution of more nearly
homogeneous expectations in the market as a whole.
The formulation of homogeneous expectations is further reinforced by the lawyer's role as a proselytizer. According to
Suchman, proselytizing involves "foster[ing] and reinforc[ing]
community norms by promoting certain types of financing transactions over others,"54 and providing "counseling about the
range of 'reasonable' terms and valuations, [and] subtly steering
clients towards negotiating positions that comport with the prevailing community practices. ' 55 As one lawyer explained, "the
markets for these deals are very inefficient and people don't have
a good idea of what kind of payments are involved so as a lawyer
who sees lots of these deals, we're sort of an information repository about how these deals get done.

'56

Thus, the lawyer-

proselytizer, by "serv[ing] as a crucial repository for information
about the range of reasonable terms and valuations," is promoting, both within the individual transaction and the community as
a whole, more nearly homogeneous expectations about the risk
and return associated with different types of transactions. 7
In sum, because lawyers' roles as counselors, dealmakers,
matchmakers, gatekeepers and proselytizers are "explainable by
their relation to one or more of the perfect market assumptions
on which capital asset pricing theory is based, '58 they might be
interpreted as "tracks" of Silicon Valley lawyers' value creating
activities in both individual venture capital financing transactions
and the market for venture capital as a whole.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION

In discussing the implications of his theory of the business lawyer as transaction cost engineer, Gilson suggests that it is important to understand the ways that lawyers create value since once
54

Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 20.
55 On Advice, supra note 4, at 111.
56 Id.
57
This point is implicitly recognized by Suchman when he explains that the lawyer-proselytizer, by "creat[ing], transmit[ting], sustain[ing] and enforc[ing] a normative and cognitive order that increases the stability and predictability of the local
capital market," Hired Gun, supra note 4, at 18, plays an important role in
"facilitat[ing] smoothly-functioning capital markets by socializing the entrepreneur
in the conventions of the local investor community." Id. at 21.
58 Gilson, supra note 15, at 256.
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the mechanisms by which they do so are identified it becomes
immediately apparent that other market participants, such as investment bankers, could easily become skilled transaction cost
engineers. This leads him to conclude that unless lawyers also
acquire and perfect the skills needed to create value in this way,
much of the legal profession's business may, in the future, be
competed away. He suggests, however, that if lawyers develop a
"self-conscious understanding of the function they really perform,"59 they will be more likely to "[c]ompet[e] successfully for
the role of transaction cost engineer."60 Suchman's work suggests that lawyers in the Silicon Valley have just such a clear understanding of their function. Silicon Valley lawyers explicitly
recognize the importance of the many traditionally non-legal
roles they play. For example, one lawyer observed, "business
lawyers.., tend to be counselors in the broader sense.... Larry
Sonsini... he's gone beyond just being a lawyer into being something of a business advisor, '"61 while another noted, "[t]here's a
lot of nonlegal advising that goes on,"" and a senior partner explained, "good lawyers in this practice have to provide more than
simply legal advice. They are a wonderful resource for business
advice ...

the business lawyer is a repository of experience."63

Whether this self-conscious recognition of the functions they perform will in fact enable lawyers to retain their privileged position
in the Silicon Valley remains to be seen. The next few years
should, however, provide an interesting test for Gilson's hypothesis that if lawyers understand the ways they create value they
will be better able to compete for business.
59

Id.at 302. Although in his comment on this essay Suchman suggests that
Silicon Valley "[l]awyers generally disavow technical or financial expertise," Translation Costs, supra note 4,at 263, his dissertation contains extensive evidence that
Silicon Valley lawyers view themselves, and are viewed by their clients, as being
business advisors as well as legal advisors. See generally On Advice, supra note 4, at
ch. 5; see also infra text accompanying notes 61-63. He also provides evidence that
clients, even the more sophisticated venture capitalists, are willing to acknowledge
that lawyers often give solid business advice. As one venture capitalist put it, "the
legal people get involved in giving nonlegal advice also ...oh yeah. They [the
lawyers] see enough of the business issues and most of them are not shy about
checking in and saying, 'look at this.' I think that's probably a positive. You want
them to have their head in the game, in terms of understanding some of these business issues." On Advice, supra note 4, at 102.
60 Gilson, supra note 15, at 302.
61 On Advice, supra note 4, at 95.
62
Id.at 100.
63
d. at 101.
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At this juncture, it is important to note that while this essay
has tried to identify ways that Silicon Valley lawyers might create
value for their clients, the extent to which they actually do so
cannot be determined from Suchman's study. As Suchman himself recognizes, his findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that "lawyers earn their pay primarily as touts and bouncers
for the prevailing legal regime," 64 a regime that might increase
the Silicon Valley legal profession's profits by, for example, creating socially constructed barriers to entry that prevent lawyers
from other parts of the country from effectively competing for
Silicon Valley business. 65 In order to determine whether value
creation or a desire to obtain and retain market power can better
account for the many roles played by Silicon Valley lawyers, it
would be necessary to, among other things, subject the dominant
forms of the venture capital financing agreement to the type of
clause-by-clause analysis Gilson applies to the corporate acquisition agreement, something Suchman fails to do. It would also be
desirable to wait until a particular set of contractual archetypes
had remained stable over a significant period of time before undertaking this type of analysis. It is, however, important to note
that because unlike the typical corporate acquisition agreement
analyzed by Gilson, which deals with a one-time transaction, a
venture capital financing agreement creates a long-term relational contract between the parties, many of the most important
terms of this contract may be implicit in the parties' relations and
understandings rather than explicitly dealt with through detailed
contractual provisions. As a consequence, any attempt to determine whether Silicon Valley lawyers actually create value for
their clients would have to look not only at the terms of the parties' written agreements, but also in great detail at the social and
organizational environment in which these transactions are
concluded.
In his comment on this essay Suchman characterizes the application of economic analysis to sociological data as an act of
Translation Costs, supra note 4, at 267.
Given their control over Silicon Valley's capital flow, see supra text accompanying notes 31-33, and their active role in creating and transmitting constitutive information, including "cultural norms, definitions and scripts that construct both
decision makers and decisions--chartering certain entities as purpose-bearing actors; imbuing those entities with particular tastes, values and objectives; and establishing for those entities menus of strategic options and typologies of situational
considerations," Translation Costs, supra note 4, at 262 n.12, it is possible that
Silicon Valley lawyers are able to exercise a great deal of market power.
64
65
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"translation," a characterization that stems, at least in part, from
his view that the disciplines of economics and sociology are in
some respects antagonistic and that each is directed at "highlighting certain features of the social world, while downplaying
others."6 6 This essay, however, has sought to take a different ap-

proach, one that views economics and sociology as compatible
and complementary disciplines.67 This perspective suggests that

economics can assist sociologists in designing their studies as well
as inidentifying common patterns across sociological data sets,
and that taking sociological considerations into account can help
economists demonstrate the predictive and explanatory power of
some models in the law and economics literature as well as economic analysis more generally. 68
Suchman is, however, correct that the blend of law & economics and law & sociology attempted in this essay is largely an act of
66 Translation Costs, supra note 4, at 259.
67

The tensions between economics and sociology that Suchman identifies in his
comments on this essay, see id. at 259-60, are based almost exclusively on a view of
economics as pure neo-classical economics, a view that ignores the emerging economic literature on the evolution of norms and the theory of repeat play games,
literatures that have given economists the tools necessary to model increasingly
complex social interactions. For an overview of the application of game theoretic
approaches to legal topics, see BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
68 See, e.g., ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTE DisPuTEs 167 (1991) (using evidence from a number of case studies to support
the hypothesis that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms
whose content serves to maximize the aggregate welfare that members obtain in
their work-a-day affairs with one another"); Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INrEPDisc. L.. 59 (1994) (discussing how taking
social norms and other relational factors into account enriches rather than undermines the analysis and predictions of various approaches, including the economic
approach, to default rules analysis); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal ContractualRelations in the Diamond Industry , 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992) [hereinafter Opting Out] (discussing the importance of taking social norms
and sanctions into account in assessing the efficiency of any transactional rule or
measure of damages); Robert Cooter, Structural Efficiency and the New Law
Merchant, 14 INT'L REV. OF LAW & ECON. 307 (1994) (suggesting that rather than
attempting to evaluate the "efficiency" properties of a norm according to objective
criteria, the courts should look to the structure of the situation in which the norm
was generated to see if the situation is of a type that would be likely to give rise to
efficient norms); Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349
(1981) (developing a "theory of the ethnically homogeneous middleman group," and
using it to better understand the trading patterns of Chinese middlemen); Eric Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on
Collective Action, (forthcoming in the University of Chicago Law Review) (arguing
that the existence of solidary groups with their own norms must be taken into account when trying to predict the effect of certain legal rules on behavior).
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translation, and as such can make only a limited substantive contribution to the literature. However, even if the contribution that
economic analysis can make to sociology may be limited, though
not nearly so limited as Suchman suggests, when economics is
brought in at the end stage of a study when the issues to be explored have been defined and the data have been collected, this
does not mean that its contribution will be similarly limited when
economics is used to inform the design and execution of sociological studies.
In sum, analyzing the findings of Suchman's study in terms of
Gilson's value creation framework can help teach business lawyers an important lesson, namely that in many contexts state contingent contracting is only one of a variety of ways of dealing
with the risk of various different types of opportunism that might
arise in contractual relationships. Although the alternative, extralegal, ways of constraining opportunism will differ depending
on the social and transactional context in which a deal is concluded,6 9 failure to consider the existence of extralegal and social
norm-based constraints on behavior7" may lead lawyers to "the
crime of which lawyers7 are constantly accused and are often
guilty-overlawyering." 1

69 See Gilson, supra note 15, at 312 (noting that "while the potential for opportunism may be universal, the efficiency of a particular solution in large measure may
be accidentally and historically determined").
70 It is, however, also important to note that in many contexts it may be more
expensive to resort to extralegal constraints on behavior than it is to draft a host of
detailed contractual provisions. See Opting Out, supra note 68, at 132 (suggesting
that in some contexts "[it is not clear a priori that th[e] costs [of drafting detailed
contractual provisions] are necessarily higher than those incurred in the formation of
an extralegal contract consummated with a handshake").
71 Edward Bernstein, supra note 22, at 191.

